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ARISTIDES AT SAL AMIS.
§ 1. BETWEEN the invasion of Greece by
t)atis and Artaphernes and the invasion by
Xerxes an important change had taken place
at Athens in the military organization. At
Marathon the supreme command was still
vested in the Polemarch; but in the year
487-6 B.c. the method of lot was introduced
for appointing the nine archons, and this
innovation necessarily involved the displace-
ment of the Polemarch from the chief
command, as that post could obviously not
be ksafely vested in a man chosen by the
chances of the lottery. The control of the
army was transferred, not to a new Com-
mander-in-chief, but to the body of the Ten
Strategoi, who had hitherto been merely the
commanders of the contingents of the ten
Cleisthenic tribes. It has been thought that
the first idea was that the chief command
should rotate among the ten generals, each
enjoying it for a day, and that a recollection
of this temporary and eminently unpractical
arrangement has survived in the well-known
anachronistic representation which Herodotn s
gives of the state of things existing at
Marathon. But if such an arrangement
was ever actually adopted—for instance in
the Aeginetan warJ—it had been luckily
condemned and abolished before the great
crisis of 480. In that year we find the
supreme command entrusted to one man,
who is thus in the position of T)yti*wv
o-rpon/yos. In the earlier part of the civil
year 480-79, throughout the campaign of
Artemisium and Salamis, Themistocles holds
this position ; in the later part of the civil
year—from the spring of 479 forward—
Themistocles has given way to Xanthippus.
In the land-campaign of Plataea and in the
sea-campaign of Mycale we find Aristides
general of the hoplites and Xanthippus
general of the triremes.2 Thus when the
land forces and the sea forces were operating
independently, as in B.C. 479, there were two
supreme commanders; but where the land
forces were acting in subordination to the
fleet, as in B.C. 480, there was one supreme
commander. This was the arrangement
dictated by common sense.
§ 2. We learn from the'XOyvaitav IIoAiTeta.
1
 It is ingeniously conjectured by Mr. Maean
[Herodotus 2, p. 145, n. 9) that the circumstance that
the Athenian fleet arrived one day too late on the occa-
sion of the conspiracy of Nicodromus may have been
due to the existence of this absurd system in 487 B.c.
2
 See Herodotus vii. 197 ; viii. 131 ; ix. 28 and
114.
that there was an linf^iporovia of the
Strategoi Kara rrjv irpvTavdav iKa(rrr)v d SOKOV-
&IV KaASs apxeiv icav riva airo^eipoTov^(T(0<Tiv
Kpwovmv iv TiZi 8iKa<TTrjpia), KOLV fiiv dX<3 rifiuxrw
o TI xpr] TtaBtiv r) a.7roT€i(Tai, av o" diro<f>vyri
vaXiv apxu (c. 61). If this practice already
prevailed in 480 B.C., the question arises
whether Themistocles, after his splendid
services at Salamis, had to submit to the
indignity of such a deposition. In such a
matter the expression of Diodorus (or
Ephorus) carries no weight, and the state-
ment that S^afievov rov ©e/<uo-roKA.eovs ras
Scoptas 6 8^/^os TU>V A07jvai(i>v aTricrrqcrtv
orpaT^yias (Diod. xi. 27) is vitiated by the
cause assigned for the act of the people.
But it should in any case be pointed out that
it is not necessary to assume a formal
deposition. The change in the supreme
command of the fleet can be fully explained
by a difference in views between Themistocles
and the other leaders of the confederate
army. It is recorded that Themistocles
advocated operations in the Hellespont
(Herodotus viii. 109), and those are doubtless
right who (like Busolt, G. G. ii2. 717) con-
nect his surrender of the command (why not
a formally voluntary surrender 1) with his
peculiar views as to the general conduct of
the campaign.
§ 3. In any case the supreme command in
the warfare of 479 B.C. was vested in the
two ostracized statesmen Xanthippus and
Aristides. When the Persian danger
threatened, a decree of amnesty was passed 3
permitting ostracized persons, as well as other
exiles (with certain exceptions), to return to
their country: and the motive of this
measure must have been (as Plutarch
suggests) the fear that powerful citizens in
banishment might medize and do serious hurt
to Athens. One expects that Xanthippus and
Aristides would have returned as soon as
they could, if they intended to return at all.
That Xanthippus returned some weeks at
least before the battle of Salamis was fought
is assumed by the anecdote which Plutarch
tells about his dog (Themist. 10). But the
return of Aristides is described by Herodotus
as having occurred in very sensational cir-
cumstances on the eve of the battle of
Salamis. The synedrion of the Greek
generals was sitting; the debate ' either
continued all night or was adjourned to an
3
 'KB. TTO\. 23. Comrare Stahl, Bhein. Museum,
46, 253 sqq.
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hour before daybreak on the following
morning, when an incident, interesting, as
well as important, gave to it a new turn.
The ostracized Aristeidgs arrived at Salamis
from Aegina. Since the revocation of his
sentence—a revocation proposed by Themis-
tokles himself—he had had no opportunity
of revisiting Athens, and he now for the
first time rejoined his countrymen in their
exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the
discussions raging, and of the impatience of
the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus.
He was the first to bring the news that such
retirement had become impracticable from
the position of the Persian fleet, which his own
vessel in coming from Aegina ' had only
eluded under favour of night. He caused
ThemistoklSs to be invited out from the
assembled synod of chiefs, and after a
generous exordium wherein he expressed his
hope that their rivalry would for the future
be only a competition in doing good to their
common couutry, apprised him that the new
movement of the Persians excluded all hope
of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered
further debate useless.' Themistooles ' de-
sired Aristeid^s to go himself into the synod
and communicate the news; for if it came
from the lips of Themistokles, the Pelopon-
nesians would treat it as a fabrication.'
Thus Grote narrates, after Herodotus, the
extremely dramatic meeting of the two
rivals. We must indeed modify the state-
ment of the revocation of the sentence of
Aristides—which Grote does not derive
from Herodotus—so far as, in accordance
with the 'AOtjvaiwv iroXiTtia (and Plutarch,
Arist. 8), to speak rather of the revocation
of the sentences of all ostracized persons.
This incident is one of those excellent
stories of Herodotus, in reading which one
cannot forbear entertaining the suspicion
that they are incidents which ought to have
occurred if real life were only artistic, but
which, since real life is nothing if not in-
artistic, never did. One wonders why Aris-
tides did not return before. The lateness
of his return can only be explained by the
assumption of some distant place of exile,
like Sicily, and if he had gone to Sicily we
should probably have heard of it. But it
certainly was a very remarkable coinci-
dence that the earliest opportunity of re-
turn for him was on the eve of Salamis,
an opportunity which enabled him to
have a dramatic meeting with his rival
and achieve a sensational appearance be-
fore the Synedrion. I t should be observed
that Grote's words ' he had had no oppor-
tunity of revisiting Athens ' do not express
a direct statement of Herodotus but only a
natural, if not necessary, inference from the
story. And we should have no alternative
but (with or without mental reserves) to
accept the story, as one of those rare cases
in which history has trespassed on the
domain of fiction and created an artistic
situation by means of an improbable coinci-
dence, if it were not for a fact in the
subsequent narrative which supplies an
objective justification of our suspicions.
§ 4. We must go back to the moment at
which the Greek fleet, having received the
tidings of the disaster of Thermopylae,
arrived in the Saronic gulf. The Athenians
had to take hasty measures for their own
safety, since the confederate army of the
Peloponnesians was at the Isthmus and the
invasion of Attica was imminent. Herodotus
(8, 41) says that a public proclamation
((ciflouyjua) was made to the effect: 'AOrjvalwv
rg rts Svvarai o-wfciv reava re KCU TOVS oi/ceras.
The Constitution of the Athenians (23) sup-
plements this brief statement by the
perfectly credible notice (repeated by
Plutarch) that the Areopagus assisted the
citizens when leaving Attica for places of
refuge by a distribution of eight drachmae a
head. But it adds the improbable suggestion
that the Strategoi were unequal to the occasion
and that the council of the Areopagus took
in hand the organization of the general
embarkation. Plutarch (and his source is
supposed to be an Atthis) speaks of a
psephism proposed by Themistocles : TTJV fiikv
ffoA.iv TrapaKaTaSetrOai rrj 'A6rjva TQ ' Adrjvaiov
/jLtSeovfrr], TOVS 8' ev rjXuclq. iravTas e/xfiaiveiv eis
rots rptijpcis, TraiSas 8e «al ywat/cas (cat dvSpd-
iroSa cra^eiv tuaxTTov <os Swarov (Themist. 10)
The statements of Herodotus and Plutarch
are of course quite compatible. The Ecclesia
passed a psephism, in consequence of which
a public proclamation was made. And the
last clause in Plutarch's description of the
contents of the psephisma is identical in
sense with the effect of the proclamation.
Herodotus however says nothing of the
clause TOVS ev rjXuda ira.VTa<s efifjaivuv eh ras
rpvfipeis. I t is important to consider the full
bearing of this clause. The transportation
of households and property to various places
of refuge—Salamis, Aegina, Troezen—is
quite clear; but can it really have been that
all the able-bodied men served on shipboard 1
This is evidently what Plutarch meant, and
is illustrated by the story of Cimon dedi-
cating his bridle on the Acropolis (Cimon 5),
Modern historians have not questioned the
statement. ' By the most strenuous efforts,'
says Grote, ' these few important days were
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made to suffice for removing the whole
population of Attica—those of military
competence to the fleet at Salamis1—the
rest to some place of refuge—together with
as much property as the case admitted.'
But it is extremely difficult to take the
statement literally. The Athenian triremes
were already manned ; and it is impossible
to suppose that the fixed number of men
(two hundred) in any trireme could have
been seriously increased, with advantage, or
without detriment, to the efficiency of the
vessel in a naval action. But allowing that
a certain number of recruits might have
supplemented losses sustained at Artemisium
and even increased by a small addition the
regular crew of each trireme, it can hardly
be questioned that the number of those who
' went on board the triremes' for the first
time at Salamis, was a minority of- 01 iv
rjXiKia. Ttavres. We may say with certainty
that the land army—for though Athens had
thrown her main strength into the navy she
still had a land force, that which afterwards
fought at Plataea—did not, as a whole,
embark. This conclusion is confirmed by
another consideration. A part of the re-
fugees carried their households to Salamis,
and this circumstance implies that some
measures beyond the proximity of the fleet,
which might be obliged to leave its position
in the Salaminian bay or might be defeated,
were taken for the defence of that island.
And as a matter of fact we find, in the
account of the battle, that there were
hoplites posted on Salamis (Herodotus
8. 95), to whom I will presently return.
We may therefore conclude that, although
some men may have been taken from the
army for naval service, yet the hoplite force
as a whole was not broken up. I t is not
difficult to account for the phrase in
Plutarch, without disputing that his
authority genuinely intended to give the
purport of an actual decree. The decree
probably said in so many words that the
whole population was to embark, in order
to be removed to the various places of
refuge. There is every reason to suppose
that the'fleet was used for the purpose of
removal. This general embarkation, con-
bined with the fact that the army played
little more than the part of a spectator at
Salamis and was quite in subordination to
the fleet, created the idea that all able bodied
Athenians fought on shipboard at Salamis.
1
 These words are in themselves ambiguous, not
necessarily meaning service on shipboard ; but this is
accidental, for Grote had told the story of Cimon and
gives no hint that he does not adopt the usual view.
It is an idea however that we do not find in
Herodotus.
§ 5. If I may be allowed to turn aside for
an instant from my immediate purpose, the
question may be asked whether, as we have
found hoplites in Salamis, all the hoplites
(apart from any who did take service in the
navy) were posted there. An affirmative
answer would have to be given, if it were
certain that Athens had been utterly and
absolutely abandoned. But this seems to
me very far from certain, and on the con-
trary it may, I think, be maintained that a
small part of the Athenian army was left at
Athens. To show this, the story of Herodo-
tus must be examined.
The Persians, we are told (8, 51) when
they arrived in the city, found it deserted,
save for a few people, the Tamiae of the
Temple of Athena, and some poor men, on
the acropolis. These few men gave the
Persians much trouble and held out «ri
XpoVov avxyov—an expression which from
other notes of time has been reckoned to
represent about a fortnight.2 If a few
7T€vrjres avOpioiroi could defy the forces of
Xerxes so long, the Athenian generals might
well be asked whether they were wise in
abandoning such a strong position as their
citadel. Defended by a properly organized
garrison, might it not have successfully
withstood all attempts of the Persians to
take it, until it was relieved through a naval
victory ?
Herodotus himself gives us the means of
criticizing his story, and without design
discloses the truth. We are surprised to
read that, when the Greeks at Salamis heard
of the capture of the Acropolis, they fell
into great consternation; cs TOOWTW 66pv/3ov
atriKOVTO, wore h/uti w oTpa/rr)yS>v ovBk
KvpwOrjvai efievov TO irpoKetfievov irpfjyfia, dAA.'
?S Te rots yeas icremirrov xai urrta rjeipovro <us
airoOevaoiievoi.. But if the Acropolis was
abandoned and left without any defence,
save that of a few poor or eccentric people
who chose to remain with the Tamiae of the
Temple, it is clear that its capture must
have seemed a foregone conclusion. The
utter consternation of the Greeks is incon-
sistent with the narrative which represents
the citadel as left without deliberate defence.
The inference is that the Athenian generals
placed a garrison in tlie Acropolis, and that
the tale told by Herodotus is only a tale.
And it is a tale of which the origin can
he analyzed. It is an example of history
reconstructed on oracles, which were them-
selves constructed on history.
2
 Busolt 2, 694.
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Herodotus relates (7, 140, 141) that the
Athenians sent to consult the Delphic oracle.
The answer—bidding them flee to the ends
of the earth and ending with the verse
dAA.' ITOV cf dSvToio Kaxois 8' eViiaSvaTe Ovpov—
was so disheartening that they asked a
second time, in the posture of suppliants,
and received the following oracle :—
ov 8vraT<n At" 'OXvfX/Ttiov i£i\d-
j7 Aoyois KO£ fir/riSi irVKvrj.
col 8e TO8' OVTIS tiros epeco, dS
A
TCOV aWiav yap dX«TK0/4eV(Di/, o<ra Kcicpiwros
ovpos
5 Ivrbs ixel K€VO/J.<OV T€ Ki0aipaivos £a#£oto,
ret^os Tpiroyevei ^uXivov S1801 evpvoTra Zeis
/jLOvvov airopOryrov TeXtOtiv, TO o~e Texva T
dvijcrti.
pvqhi (rv y ijnroowrjv T« p-eveiv Kai ir«£ov
idira
oi' air r/irelpov (TTparbv fjcrvx0*, dAA'
1 0 VCUTOV «ri(TTp€l^aS' £Tt TOl ITOTt KaVTlOS
Q) Oeirj 2a\a/MS, diroAeis 8c o-ii Tex
y
I t has been long recognized that the last
two lines were composed ex eventu (cp.
"Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, Kydathen, p. 97);
but we must apply the same* principle to vv.
8—10, t h e words eri TOL irore KOVTIOS ecrcrrj con-
taining a manifest allusion to Plataea. On
the other hand there is no reason for doubting
that the Athenians consulted the oracle,—
after the disaster of Thermopylae, of course,
and not before the beginning of the war, as is
suggested by the place (before the Isthmian
congress) in which the episode is introduced
by Herodotus, though after his manner he
gives no express chronological indication.
"We may accept, without difficulty, the
first seven lines as the actual utterance of
the Delphic oracle shortly before the battle
of Salamis. But we must read them as
intended by the Delphic priesthood to be
capable of the interpretation which Themis-
tocles gave. "We must place ourselves in
the position of the Athenian government.
The wise policy, on which they resolved, of
moving the whole population of Attica was
a policy of which the execution was obviously
attended by great difficulties and likely to
meet with considerable and possibly obstinate
resistance from a large part of the people.
In such a case, there was one step which a
prudent government could not neglect,
namely, to enlist the support of the Delphic
oracle and strengthen their policy by an
appeal to the authority of the god. The
oracle which Herodotus records, shorn of its
later additions, is, to all appearances, the
result of an understanding between the
Athenian government and Delphi. The
priesthood, of course, in their usual method
safeguarded the god by using an ambiguous
phrase—rti^os tji\ivov—, which, Jin case the
policy recommended by the Athenian govern-
ment proved disastrous, admitted of other
interpretations, for instance that of ' some
of the older men' who thought that the
Acropolis was meant (c. 142). But the
oracle loses its significance so long as it is
not recognized that it is the answer of
Apollo to Themistocles and the Athenian
government seeking Delphic support for a
particular policy.
The strength of the Acropolis—the event
proves how strong it was—almost forbade
the idea of abandoning it without an attempt
to defend it. And the ambiguity of the
oracle was an additional reason. For the
most convincing answer to those who re-
ferred the oracle to the Acropolis was ' But
in any case we are taking measures to
defend it.' In this way both of the rival
interpretations would be satisfied. After-
wards, when the Acropolis had failed
aTropOTjTov rektOew and when the policy of
the government had been strikingly ap-
proved by fortune, the history of the events
was recomposed with regard to what was
now recognized universally as the true
meaning of the oracle. The unsuccessful
defence of the Acropolis was represented as
the act of a few poor insignificant people
and not a deliberate and organized military
resistance.
§ 6. Respecting, then, the disposition of
the Greek army at the time of Salamis, it
emerges from this discussion, that, while a
few hoplites were probably transferred for
naval service, a distinct detachment was
deputed to garrison the Acropolis, and the
remainder, by far the greater part, was
posted in Salamis. There were ten Strategoi,
some of whom, along with the chief Strategos
Themistocles, commanded the ships, but
some—at least one—must have been in
command of the hoplites on the island of
Salamis. It was their—or his—business,
on the day of the battle, to act according to
the fortunes of the fleet, and take defensive
or offensive measures according to the
exigency of the case. As it turned out,
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offensive action was called for, and such
action on the part of the hoplites is duly
recorded by Herodotus. They crossed over
from the shore of Salamis to Psyttaleia and
slaughtered all the Persians who were on
the islet. But we are astonished to read
that the hoplites act not under the direction
of a strategos but under the command of a
private person, the ostracized Aristides, who
had returned from banishment only the
night before.
There is a manifest difficulty in reconciling
this incident with the dramatic episode of
the first appearance of Aristides on the eve
of Salamis. One could readily understand a
private person of influence and energy
gathering a number of volunteers for some
patriotic service at a critical moment, but
one cannot easily conceive a private person
usurping the functions of the StratSgos over
a portion of the army.
The simple solution is that Aristides was
himself one of the Stratk/oi. Herodotus did
not apprehend this, and, although he no-
where says expressly that Aristides returned
from exile on the eve of Salamis, his account
of the interview between Aristides and
Themistocles most readily lends itself to
such a reading. All the facts are true—the
fact that Aristides brought the news that
the Greeks were surrounded, and the fact
that he managed the affair of Psyttaleia.
But the suppression of the fact that he was
Strat&gos has made it possible to represent
him as reappearing for the first time at the
Synedrion of the generals on the eve of
Salamis.
§ 7. But if Aristides was Strategos, how
came it that he crossed over from Aegina
(e£ Alyivr]s Sie/Jij) on the night before the
battle ? We have here an illustration of
the disconnected nature of the sources from
which Herodotus drew his material. If
Aristides was a Strategos his absence at this
crisis must have been for the purpose of some
public service. Now Herodotus records
that a trireme had returned from Aegina,
before the battle began (viii. 83 KOU fji<e rj COT'
Alylvrjs Tpiyprjs)—the trireme which had
been dispatched to bring the Aeacids (c. 64).
The obvious conclusion is that this was the
ship in which Aristides crossed over from
Aegina, and that he had been deputed to
take charge of the mission to bring the
Aeacids.
§ 8. It is to be observed that this hypo-
thesis does not contradict any statement of
Herodotus. That historian nowhere says
that the diabasis of Aristides from Aegina
was his first return to his country. Nor is
the fundamental importance of the dialogue
between Themistocles and Aristidesabolished,
although its dramatic effect is weakened.
The significance of that dialogue still re-
mains, assuming, however, the shape of a
hearty cooperation between two Strat^goi at
the Synedrion in which both—Aristides as
well as Themistocles—were entitled to take
part. I t may be added that the hypothesis
is confirmed by the political wisdom of
reconciling the ostracized statesmen on their
return by entrusting to them at once posts
of importance. We may guess * that
Xanthippus too was one of the ten Strat&goi
in the autumn of 480 B.C., and that when
in the spring of the.following year he acted
as chief admiral in place of Themistocles, he
was not elected as a new Strategos but was
raised from a subordinate to the chief place
in that portion of the Strategic board which
was concerned with the fleet. In any case
Aristides retained his Strategia throughout
the campaign of the following year, and, as
the land army was then acting independently
of the fleet, he played a part of greater
prominence than he was allowed to play at
Salamis.
1
 The anecdote of his dog, left behind on the Attic
coast and drowned in an attempt to swim across to
Salamis, suggests that Xanthippus was remembered
in connection with the removal of the Attic population
before the battle, and raises the presumption that he
took part in organizing that removal, and therefore
that he held a public office, which may have been
that of stratfSgos.
J. B. BURY.
THE CORINTHIAN CONSTITUTION AFTER THE FALL OP THE CYPSELIDES.
THE constitution of Corinth established
after the expulsion of the tyrants is thus
described by Nicolaus Damascenus (Miiller,
F.H.G. fr. 60) : CU/TOS Sk (sc. 6 Srj/ios) Trapa-
ToiavSe • fj.iav
fiev oKTaSa rrpofSov\<ov oroi^cey, e/c Si rS>v
konrwv fiovkriv Kare\t£ev avSpwv ff.
This passage has given scholars a great
deal of trouble. And, indeed, the number
of members of the fiovXr) indicated in the
